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Abstract Decision Support Systems (DSS) are complex technological tools, which
enable an accurate and complete scenario awareness, by integrating data from both
“external” (physical) situation and current behaviour and state of functioning of the
technological systems. The aim is to produce a scenario analysis and to guess
identify educated the most efﬁcient strategies to cope with possible crises. In the
domain of Critical Infrastructures (CI) Protection, DSS can be used to support
strategy elaboration from CI operators, to improve emergency managers capabili-
ties, to improve quality and efﬁciency of preparedness actions. For these reasons,
the EU project CIPRNet, among others, has realised a new DSS designed to help
operators to deal with the complex task of managing multi-sectorial CI crises, due
to natural events, where many different CI might be involved, either directly or via
cascading effects produced by (inter-)dependency mechanisms. This DSS, called
CIPCast, is able to produce a real-time operational risk forecast of CI in a given
area; other than usable in a real-time mode, CIPCast could also be used as scenario
builder, by using event simulators enabling the simulation of synthetic events
whose impacts on CI could be emulated. A major improvement of CIPCast is its
capability of measuring societal consequences related to the unavailability of pri-
mary services such as those delivered by CI.
1 Introduction
The set of Critical Infrastructures (CI) constitutes nowadays an enabling pillar of
societal life. They guarantee the supply of vital services (transport of energy
products, telecommunication, drinkable water delivery, provide mobility functions)
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thus concurring to the achievement of citizens’ (and societal as a whole) well-being.
CI are complex technological or engineering systems: they are thus vulnerable as
exposed to natural and anthropic-related events. Physical damages inflicted to CI
elements might produce severe repercussions on their functioning which can reduce
(or even reset) their functionality. Other than being individually wounded and
functionally reset, they can propagate perturbations to other CI to whom they are
functionally (inter-)connected. Connection and inter-connection are two relevant
properties of systems of CI: connection indicates a one-direction supply mechanism,
when one CI supplies a service to another. When such a service is no longer
provided, the supplied CI may undergo a more or less severe perturbation.
Inter-dependency indicates the presence of feedback loops: a CI might perturb other
CI which, directly or through a further perturbation to other CI, could
back-propagate the perturbation to the CI which initiates the perturbation cascade.
This might produce a further functionality degradation which is amplify the negative
feedback loop, by producing more and more serious effects. Cascading effects may
spread perturbations on large geographical scales, on time scales ranging from a few
second to days, producing reversible and, in some cases, irreversible societal effects.
Other than having repercussion on citizen activities, CI damages and the con-
sequent services perturbation could affect the environment and produce large
economic losses. Industrial activities are directly related to the supply of these
services; their loss directly implies a lack of production and revenues contraction. In
some cases, moreover, CI outages might produce environmental damages (gas
release, spill of oil or other products, ﬁres releasing toxic products, nanoparticles,
ashes) that further increase the societal consequences.
As CI deliver relevant (in some cases, “vital”) services to the citizens, their
societal impact has increased signiﬁcantly in the last century. For these reasons,
signiﬁcant efforts are going to be produced at the national and EU scales, either at
the governance level1 and by deploying the most advanced technologies.
Major beneﬁts for protecting CI and enhancing the continuity of services they
deliver could come from the deployment of technological systems providing access
to crisis related data, allowing their monitoring and, whenever possible, the pre-
diction of their occurrence, allowing the setup of timely preparedness and mitigation
actions. A relevant role in this context could be played by Decision Support Systems
(DSS). These are technological tools that can be functional to support the whole risk
analysis process up to crisis management, in the preparatory and the hot phases.
A new concept of DSS should account for, and support, all phases of the risk
analysis process: event forecast (where applicable/predictable), prediction of reli-
able and accurate damage scenarios, estimate of the impact that expected damages
could have on services (in terms of reduction or loss of the services) also accounting
for perturbation spreading via cascading effects, estimate of the possible conse-
quences to citizens and to other sectors of societal life. The complete DSS workflow
1COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identiﬁcation and designation
of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.
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should end up with the identiﬁcation and deﬁnition of preparedness and emergency
strategies that, taking into account the different phases of the expected crisis (event,
damage, impact and consequence) could be adopted to reduce the impact, speed-up
mitigation and healing procedures, ease the recovery phase, thus reducing as much
as possible the extent, the severity and the duration of the crisis.
Such new concept of DSS can also be used as effective simulation tools to
perform comprehensive stress tests on areas where the impact deriving from CI
crises could be large and relevant. This activity would produce educated contin-
gency plans based on the analysis of many (synthetic) crisis scenarios instead of
being built upon (a few, when available) records of historical events. This will
enhance their quality and adapt them to the effective current scenario conditions (in
terms of infrastructures, assets, available technical tools, current settings of the
crisis or emergency management etc.).
The EU project CIPRNet2 has thus devoted a considerable effort to realize an
novel DSS enabling to tackle the entire workflow of risk forecast of CI, from event
prediction to consequences analysis.
The DSS can be supported by a large database of information collected from
public and private sources. Furthermore, the DSS collects many different real-time
data from the ﬁeld (meteorological stations, sensor networks, meteorological radars,
etc.) and forecasts from several publicly available sources (Meteorological Ofﬁce,
Earthquake alerts systems, etc.) producing a comprehensive assessment of the
physical state of the area (urban, district, regional up to a national scale).
The availability of the geographical position (in terms of geospatial data) of the
CI elements and the networks would allow, through the correlation between the
physical vulnerability to natural events and the strength of expected event mani-
festation, to formulate an educated guess of the probability that some of the CI
elements could be physically damaged by a perturbation. This analysis would thus
allow to produce a “damage scenario” containing location and probability of pre-
dicted faults.
Starting from the “damage scenario”, the DSS will attempt, through the analysis
of appropriate simulation tools, to emulate the outages on the affected networks
and, through the CI dependency information, to reproduce the effects of the cas-
cading events propagating faults from one network to the others. This task would
result in the “impact scenario”, i.e. the expected proﬁle of services unavailability
over time for all the considered infrastructures.
Such data would further allow to estimating the consequences that services
unavailability might produce on the different societal sectors. This is the goal of the
“consequence analysis” which is meant to transform the “impact scenario” into a
prediction of the social severity of the crisis, by measuring, through appropriate
metrics, the consequences associated to the population, the industrial activities, the
primary services (Hospitals functionality, schools, public ofﬁces, public
2CIPRNet, Critical Infrastructures Preparedness and Resilience research Network has been funded
by EU FP7 under GA No. 312450.
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transportation) and the environment (in the case when a CI crisis is associated to
some type of an environmental damage).
The last step of the DSS would be the elaboration of an optimal strategies for the
systems recovery by analysing possible “recovery sequences” of the different ele-
ments: the sequence “score” is evaluated in order to reduce as much as possible the
social costs of the crisis.
The project CIPRNet has introduced all these elements into the DSS which has
been designed and realized as one of the major outcomes of its joint technological
activities. The DSS was called CIPCast. We will refer to this name in the course of
this work when considering the CIPRNet DSS.
2 Design Study
In order to cast all the expected DSS properties and functions, we tried to translate
the expected functionalities into a number of prescriptions, of practical issues and of
technological requests to the DSS for enabling the implementation of those func-
tions. These are the major key-words which have been translated into related
functionalities of the DSS.
(1) Prediction. The system should provide a reliable forecast of the predictable
events (e.g., heavy rainfalls, floods, etc.) with a signiﬁcant anticipation, in a
way to enable operators and other emergency players to set in place pre-
paredness actions. A better choice is the setup of an incremental prediction that
should start “pre-alert” periods with a large anticipation and a subsequent
progressive reﬁnement of the quality and the quantity of the prediction as the
event time approaches.
(2) Multi-hazards. Natural and anthropic threats may damage CI. Although nat-
ural hazards (in their “intensiﬁed” strength due to climatic changes) are at
forefront in public opinion, there is evidence of an increasing level of threat due
to deliberate attacks, either to the physical and/or to the cyber integrity of the
infrastructures. The DSS should thus be able either to analyse risks by pre-
dicting the occurrence (wherever possible) of natural threats and to provide
support in the analysis of impacts due to deliberate attacks.
(3) Dependency effects. It is clear, nowadays, that CI form an entangled set of
networks, each providing services to the others. This leads the system’s control
a multi-dimensional problem with multiple feedback loops propagating per-
turbations from one set to the others. DSS predictions should thus necessarily
consider perturbation spreading due to (inter-)dependency mechanisms. This
issue reflects into the need of having available the (physical or functional)
“connections” data enabling to link one CI to the others.
(4) Space and time scales. Perturbations spread on large geographical scales.
Electrical systems, for instance, can propagate a perturbation on large geo-
graphical areas in very short times. Although for some CI perturbations, and
perturbations spread, occur with a very short latency, for other infrastructures
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perturbation takes place on a longer time scale and, often, with a longer latency.
The DSS should thus cope with multiple time scales and the geographical
long-ranged perturbation spreading.
(5) Consequences. CI perturbations produce damage in different sectors of societal
life: from perturbing the well-being of citizens, depriving them of relevant
services to causing economic losses to industrial sectors, from reducing oper-
ability of lifelines (e.g., Hospitals) to damaging the environment. The DSS
should also estimate which are the consequences on societal life associated to
its occurrence, to provide operators and emergency managers a realistic “score”
of its impact.
(6) Data. The realization of a system enabling a qualitative and quantitative
assessment of a risk scenario does involve the availability of (often) conﬁ-
dential information. Geographical position of networks and CI elements, their
functional data during operation times are considered conﬁdential information
by operators who restrain as much as possible their divulgation. The DSS
should thus comply with these limitations and realise a trade-off for improving
quality and reliability of predictions with the constraint of having access only to
a restrained set of data from operators.
(7) Support. The presence of a multitude of data and forecast, of real time data on
the scenario can be used to infer possible strategies that could be followed to
reduce the impact and the consequences of the expected damages. The DSS
will also provide with speciﬁc “optimization” applications enabling the solution
of management problems that are normally tackled during crisis scenarios (i.e.,
the deﬁnition of the optimal restoration sequence when multiple elements
should be repaired).
The design of CIPCast has taken into account all the issues that have been
previously listed. Figure 1 shows the main functional blocks Bi of CIPCast and the
relevant components i.e. the Database and the Graphic User Interface (GUI). In the
Fig. 1 Block diagram showing the main functionalities and the relevant components of CIPCast
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following we will briefly describe the ﬁve functional blocks which will be better
analysed in the further Sections.
Monitoring of Natural Phenomena (B1). In this block, the DSS acquires
external data (real-time data, forecast) from many different sources: weather fore-
cast and nowcasting data, seismic data, real time data coming from weather stations,
hydrometer levels from water basins. These data are acquired to establish the
current and predicted external conditions.
Prediction of Natural Events (B2). This block estimates the expected mani-
festation strength of all the predicted events. Predictions are made on different time
scales: short time scale (up to 60 min from the current time), medium-long range
time scale (within 48 h from the current time).
Prediction of Damage Scenarios (B3). In this block, the DSS correlates the
strength of the expected manifestations with the vulnerability of the different CI
elements present in the area where the events are predicted to occur, in order to
estimate the probability that the manifestation could effectively damage (and, in the
positive case, to what extent) the CI elements. At the end of B2 block, the DSS
elaborates a “Damage Scenario” containing the information on which CI element
(and to what extent) will be damaged in a speciﬁc time frame.
Prediction of Impact and Consequences (B4). This block converts the expected
damages of CI elements into impact on the services the CI elements produce. This is
the core of the prediction process as, in this block, the DSS transforms the expected
punctual damages (to one or more CI) into a reduction (or loss) of services. To do
that, CIPCast needs to deploy dependency data connecting the different CI in order
to reproduce faults propagation. In addition, starting from the inoperability (or partial
operability) of the different services, this block also estimates the consequences that
the loss of services produces on citizens, public services, industrial activities and the
environment. The consequences on each societal sector are estimated on the basis of
speciﬁc metrics; a distinct “consequence score” on each societal life domain is
presented separately (a uniﬁed score is not produced) in order to describe the severity
of the expected crisis under many viewpoints.
Support of efﬁcient strategies (B5). This block contains a number of applica-
tions which, taking into account the expected critical scenario, made by damages,
impacts on services and weighted by the consequences estimate, will attempt to
support operators and emergency managers to design and validate mitigation and
healing procedures. At the current state of implementation, these supporting actions
relates to:
– The identiﬁcation of the optimal strategy for the restoration of the electrical
distribution system after a fault, taking into account a multiple choices of
optimization target functions;
– The identiﬁcation of the best path which technical crews should follow (taking
into account trafﬁc conditions) to reduce restoration times;
– The optimal allocation of technical crews when the number of restoration points
exceeds that of the available crews.
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In the following, we will describe, in some more detail, each of the relevant
elements of the DSS and the technical contents of the different blocks Bni.
3 Database
The geospatial Database (DB) and the related modules (GIS Server and WebGIS
application) has been implemented by adopting a client-server architecture, using
Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) packages. Such architecture has been properly
designed to allow the interchange of geospatial data and to provide to the CIPCast
users a user-friendly application, characterised by accessibility and versatility.
The DB is a PostgreSQL object-relational database with PostGIS spatial database
extender. PostGIS adds support for geographic objects allowing location queries to
be run in SQL. The DB can be used at various levels by exploiting the potential
offered by GIS tools, starting with the effective support for the operational man-
agement in the frame of the risk assessment workflow.







Short term (<2 h)
Medium term (>2 h and <24)
Long term (>24 h)
– Impact scenario
Short term (<2 h)
Medium term (>2 h and <24)
Long term (>24 h)
– Consequence analysis
Short term (<2 h)
Medium term (>2 h and <24)
Long term (>24 h)
Concerning the Input data, the DB contains the following geographical infor-
mation layers. Concerning with Static Data, the DB contains:
(1) Basic Geographical data (Administrative Layers, DEM, etc.);
(2) Lithology, geology, hydrography; Seismic data, earthquake parametric cata-
logue, seismic hazard maps and seismic micro-zoning (Florence area);
9 Design of DSS for Supporting Preparedness to and Management … 201
(3) Social data (census, real estate registry etc.);
(4) Hydrogeological Risk (Inventory if Italian Landslide Events, flooding risk
maps, etc.);
(5) Infrastructures: (i) Electrical (transmission and distribution, Roma and
Emmerich areas); (ii) Water (Roma area); (iii) Gas and oil pipelines (trans-
mission, EU wide); (iv) Roads and railways (EU wide); (v) Telecom BTS
(Roma area);
(6) CI Dependencies (Rome and Emmerich areas);
(7) Point Of Interest (POI, source: TeleAtlas);
(8) Dangerous plants (source: European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register,
E-PRTR Database).
Concerning with Dynamic input data (i.e. data which are collected by ﬁeld
sensors, which are constantly updated), the DB contains:
(1) Weather stations (Regione Lazio);
(2) Tevere River hydrometers;
(3) Rain gauges measurements;
(4) Volcanic ashes (INGV Seviri-Modis data);
(5) Earthquakes (ISIDE).
Concerning with Forecast data, the DB contains:
(1) Weather forecast (12–24–36–48–72 h);
(2) Nowcasting (Regione Lazio, <60 min);
(3) Lightning (Central Italy, <45 min);
(4) Vehicle trafﬁc prediction (Roma Capitale area <90 min);
(5) Marine waves and currents (Tyrrhenian Sea, Mediterranean Sea, 5 days).
The GIS Server represents the hardware/software environment that allows
organizing information and making them accessible from the network. The
GeoServer suite has been adopted, being a largely used open source application
server, which plays a key role within the Spatial Data Infrastructure (SDI). It allows
sharing and managing (by means of different access privileges) the information
layers stored in the DB, according to the standards deﬁned by the Open Geospatial
Consortium (OGC), such as, for example, the Web Map Service (WMS). It also
supports interoperability (e.g., reads and manages several formats of geospatial
data) (Fig. 2).
The basic geospatial data and the results produced (i.e., scenarios) are stored and
managed into the DB repository in order to be exploited in the different DSS blocks.
To this end, the WebGIS application developed represents the natural geographical
interface of CIPCast. Basic information, maps and scenarios can be visualized and
queried via web, by means of standard Internet browsers and, consequently, the
main results can be easily accessible to CIPCast users.
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4 Dynamic Data
In order to predict the external scenario, CIPCast has been conﬁgured to acquire
external information by collecting real time data from ﬁeld sensors. In particular, it
acquires ﬁeld data from:
(1) Seismic sensors and seismic report data;
(2) Weather stations (reporting data on rain abundance, temperature, humidity,
winds, pressure etc.) and other devices that could be used to assess the speciﬁc
weather conditions in a given area;
(3) Hydrometers to constantly update the level in the critical section of river basins.
Concerning seismic and earthquakes data, given as initial assumption that no real
prediction can be achieved for these types of events, CIPCast receives data from the
Agency committed to release this information (e.g., the National Institute of
Geophysics and Volcanology INGV3 in Italy). In the INGV ofﬁcial site, by
accessing the Italian Seismological Instrumental and Parametric Database (ISIDE)
portal,4 information on the detected earthquakes are produced and released in real
time. Upon a constant poll to the ISIDE portal, CIPCast receives the earthquakes
data (within 1 min from the occurrence). Earthquake information consists of the
GPS coordinates of the epicentre, its depth and the measured intensity (Richter
scale). Figure 3 reports a typical snapshot of the ISIDe website.
Once earthquake data are issued, the CIPCast crawler picks them up and reports
them into the synoptic chart of the DSS geographical interface (Fig. 4). The
knowledge of the coordinates, the depth and the magnitude of the earthquake (basic
Fig. 2 Deployment diagram showing the connection among the GeoDatabase and the other DSS
core components
3INGV: Italian National Institute of Statistics: http://www.istat.it/en/.
4http://iside.rm.ingv.it/iside/standard/index.jsp?lang=en.
9 Design of DSS for Supporting Preparedness to and Management … 203
earthquake’s features) are not sufﬁcient to estimate the “physical manifestations”
associated to the natural event. Indeed, an earthquake creates distinct types of
waves with different velocities; when reaching seismic sensors, their different travel
times allow to locate the source of the hypocentre:
• Primary waves (P-waves) are compressional waves that are longitudinal in
nature and propagate faster than other waves through the earth to arrive at
seismograph stations ﬁrst (hence the name “Primary”);
Fig. 3 Snapshot of the Italian ISIDe website providing real-time data on earthquake events
occurred in the Italian territory. The portal is managed by the National Institute for Geophysics and
Volcanology, INGV
Fig. 4 ISIDe data are immediately reported into the DSS DB and visualized on the GIS web
interface
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• Secondary waves (S-waves) are shear waves that are transverse in nature:
following an earthquake event, S-waves reach seismograph stations after the
faster-moving P-waves and displace the ground perpendicular to the direction of
propagation.
In the case of local, or nearby, earthquakes, the difference in the arrival times of
the P and S waves can be used to determine the distance of the event. Once ISIDe
operators perform their validation procedures, data of the occurred earthquakes are
immediately available: based on the basic earthquake’s features, CIPCast is able to
convert them into a Shake Map dataset which contains, for each spatial point of a
given area (as large as that involved by the physical manifestations associated to the
event), the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) distribution induced by the seismic
event.
Figure 5 shows an example of a shake map.
Other than being estimated, shake maps are usually measured by seismometers
deployed all over the Italian national territory (data are ﬁrst collected and then post
processed by INGV) and then released by the INGV through the speciﬁc infor-
mation websites. This process normally takes about 20–60 min. In order to have an
earthquake shake map available in a shorter time (in order to use them for rapidly
estimating expected damages), CIPCast, starting from the basic earthquake features,
estimates the “predicted shake map” on the bases of empirical propagation models
of shock waves in the ground and of the speciﬁc ground seismic properties
(lithography and waves conductivity properties). Then, when measured shake maps
are released, CIPCast perform a second damage estimate.
Fig. 5 The reconstructed shake map (showing the PGA estimate) for the seismic event of June 23,
2013 in the area of Lunigiana (Tuscany Region, Italy)
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Concerning weather predictions, CIPCast can deploy either medium-long term
weather prediction (from 12 to 72 h) from Weather Forecasts ofﬁcial sources and
nowcasting predictions (up to 60 min from the current times) provided by X-band
radars. Regarding the nowcasting source, CIPCast receives (each 10 min) the
current estimate of rain abundance and its prediction (estimated with a Local Area
Model) for a time span of 60 min. The nowcasting data could be constituted either
by the mosaic of several stations operating in speciﬁc points (at a national scale),
mosaic which is then composed to obtain an unique picture or by a single station
sweep that covers, in turn, a limited area (usually a single nowcasting station can
cover an area of 20–30  103 km2).
In the current setting, nowcasting is produced by using data of a single station (a
meteorological X-band radar station) at Mount Media (in the Apennine region,
nearby the city of L’Aquila) whose data covering a large fraction of Centre Italy
fully comprising the Lazio Region. Data are constantly acquired and treated to
extract information. From the reflectivity signals, it is possible to estimate the rain
amount. These data are then post-processed in order to obtain the rain abundance
prediction in a grid of 1 km of spatial resolution, for the subsequent 60 min from
the current time. The resulting data (Fig. 6) are then integrated into the CIPCast DB
and used to estimate the resulting damage of the CI elements.
Same data used for nowcasting prediction scan be used to provide lightning
prediction. To this aim, CIPCast (every 15 min.) acquires lightning probability data
related to the next 45 min and visualises them on the GIS interface. The data source
computes the lightning probability using various indices of the Weather Research
and Forecasting model.5 In the current setting, the monitored area for lightning
probability covers a large fraction of centre Italy fully comprising the Lazio Region.
Figure 7 shows an example of a lightning probability map. Following the
Fig. 6 Screen snapshot of the nowcasting prediction
5http://www.wrf-model.org/index.php.
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guidelines for lightning probability greater the 60% the CI operators should monitor
their infrastructures and in particular those components that are vulnerable to
lightning events.
To sum up, there are two events prediction based on:
• Nowcasting and Lightning for the short-term where the accessed and achieved
data are sufﬁcient to estimate damage scenarios and no further data elaboration
is made in CIPCast;
• ECMWF data (Fig. 8) for the medium-long term weather prediction down-
scaled through a LAM to create a speciﬁc map reporting the spatial distribution
(approximately, 5 km  5 km) of the precipitation rate of rainfall forecasts
(mm/h). Forecasts are produced and available for a time span from 0 to 48 h
(6-h intermediate steps), starting from 0:00 a.m.—UTC of each day. Such data
are continuously and automatically retrieved from a speciﬁc web-service, in
NetCDF6 format, and directly stored into the CIPCast DB, in order to exploit
them within the DSS application (Fig. 9).
At the end, CIPCast produces a comprehensive description of the current (and
forecast) scenario, by providing a map of all the physical manifestations related to
the predicted (and/or the on-going) natural events with their magnitude (each
expressed in a speciﬁc strength metrics).
These information are then transferred to the further building block, where
event’ manifestations strength are “transformed” into expected damages to the CI
elements.
Fig. 7 A snapshot of the Lightning Probability map
6http://www.unidata.ucar.edu/software/netcdf/.
9 Design of DSS for Supporting Preparedness to and Management … 207
5 Damage Scenario Builder
Once a reliable awareness of ﬁeld data is achieved, also supported by the results of
the different forecast systems, CIPCast attempts to build a Damage Scenario
consisting of the list of all the identiﬁed CI elements expecting to be damaged by
the expected natural phenomena with the predicted strength.
The ﬁrst action is to cast the external prediction into a Threat Strength Matrix,
containing the strength of the predicted physical manifestations associated to the
expected natural events. Each natural hazard, in fact, manifests in a different way
(winds with physical pressure exerted on the structural elements, heat waves with
temperature raise etc.). If we normalize the value (expressed in the appropriate unit
of measure) of the strength of each perturbation manifestation in an arbitrary scale
from 1 to 5, we could deﬁne, for each geographical position, a Threat Strength
Matrix describing the intensity of the associated manifestations.
Table 1 shows the Threat Strength Matrix S associated to a given geographical
position (x, y). Each row contains the expected strength of the manifestation
associated to the natural event.
Whereas geographical points will be characterized by the strength of the
expected natural manifestation (cast into the Threat Strength Matrix), each CI
element (located in some geographical position) will be characterized by a
Vulnerability Matrix V, which identiﬁes, for each perturbation manifestation, the
limiting strength that the element could sustain before being damaged. The
V Matrix will then have same entries of the Threat Strength Matrix; it provides, in
turn, the limiting grade of the perturbation strength that the CI element can sustain
before failure. If, thus, the Vij element of the matrix will be different to zero, all
Fig. 8 Precipitation rate forecast example map (Himet processing of ECMWF data)
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other elements Viðjþ kÞ will be not vanishing: if Vij strength perturbs (or damages)
the CI elements, all larger strengths, a fortiori, will do.
Table 2 shows the Vulnerability Matrix V associated to a speciﬁc CI element.
Each row contains the perturbation extent that a manifestation of a speciﬁc grade is
expected to produce on the element. In general terms, the extent of physical damage
D produced by a threat manifestations S on the CI element having a vulnerability
matrix V will be given by
D ¼ max sij  vij
 
where operation indicated with  is the ordinary product between the values sij; vij 2
R of the two matrices. If D ¼ 0 the CI element will not be harmed by the per-
turbation(s), while if D 6¼ 0 it will be damaged up to a certain extent (0\D 1).
Fig. 9 Cloud cover and precipitation rate map views (Eumetsat/ECMWF)
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Figure 10 reports the WebGIS interface of CIPCast, containing various
geospatial layers and the information on the expected Damage Scenario. CI ele-
ments are classiﬁed on the bases of the prediction time of their outage (red elements
predicted to be failed in 15 min, darker-coloured elements at progressively longer
times).
Table 1 Threat strength matrix
Threat name Threat grade
1 2 3 4 5 Associated physical manifestation
Earthquake 0 0 1 0 0 PGA (peak ground acceleration)
Strong wind 0 1 0 0 0 Wind speed (pressure)
Lightening 0 0 0 0 0 Probability times voltage
Heavy snowfall 0 0 0 0 0 Weight (pressure)
Ice 0 0 0 0 0 Weight (pressure)
Landslide 0 0 0 0 0 Stress
Flash flood 0 0 0 0 0 Water level
Flooding 0 0 0 0 0 Water level
Mud flows 0 0 0 0 0 Weight (pressure)
Debris avalanches 0 0 0 0 0 Weight (pressure)
Heavy rain 0 0 0 0 0 Water level
Strom surge 0 0 0 0 0 Water level
… 0 0 0 0 0
In the example, the event will consist in an earthquake (on intensity 3 in an earthquake magnitude
scale 1–5) with an associated strong wind (of magnitude 2 in the 1–5 wind scale)
Table 2 Vulnerability matrix Threat name Vulnerability grade
1 2 3 4 5
Earthquake 0 0 0.5 1 1
Strong wind 0 1 1 1 1
Lightening 0 0 0 1 1
Heavy snowfall 0 0 0 0 1
Ice 0 0 0 0 1
Landslide 0 0 0 0 0
Flash flood 0 0 0 0 0
Flooding 0 0 0 1 1
Mud flows 0 0 0 0 0
Debris avalanches 0 0 0 0 0
Heavy rain 0 0 0 0 0
Strom surge 0 0 0 0 0
… 0 0 0 0 0
In the example the CI element whose V matrix is displayed would
be partially damaged by a grade 3 earthquake and totally
destroyed by larger magnitude events, it would be destroyed by
winds of magnitude  2, by lightning  4, by floodings  4
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6 Impact Scenario
The Impact Scenario takes the Damage Scenario as an input from the B3 block.
This contains, for a given time frame, the set of the CI elements that are predicted to
fail.
CIPCast, at this stage, run an application called RecSIM (Reconﬁguration
actions SIMulation in power grids [1, 2]) a simulator that, starting from the iden-
tiﬁcation of the behaviour of the electrical-telecommunication system upon the
outage of one (or more) of their components, spreads the perturbation also to other
CI infrastructures. This approximation (that is similar to an adiabatic approximation
while treating perturbations in quantum theory) is somehow legitimated by the fact
that the response of the electro-telecom systems occurs with characteristic times
much smaller than those of the other systems. In this respect, CIPCast ﬁrst deals
with fast degrees of freedom (electrical and telecommunication networks response)
and then propagates the perturbation to other degrees of freedom (i.e. the other CI
networks).
7 RecSIM
RecSIM is a discrete-time event-based Java simulator designed to emulate the
network management procedures by an electrical distribution system operator and
to estimate the evolution of the electric network. Although the implemented
Fig. 10 Cloud cover and precipitation rate map views (Eumetsat/ECMWF)
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operations are related to a speciﬁc electrical operator,7 these procedures should be
thought as general; they are, in fact, adopted by other operators for the reasons that
they take into account only the basic functioning mechanisms of a switched and
controllable electrical network. RecSIM assumes an electrical distribution model
where each electrical node (a primary or a secondary substation) may feed a
telecommunication device, called Base Transceiver Station (BTS) that, in turn,
ensures remote control capability to the electrical grid.
Figure 11 sketches the main ingredients (i.e. the elements) needed to design an
electro-telco grid used for the RecSIM modelling and simulation.
– Primary Substations (PS) (containing HV ! MV transformers);
– Feeders. Each PS supplies a number of MV feeders that hold the secondary
substations;
– Secondary Substations (SS) (MV ! LV transformers). Some of them are
remotely controlled (in the Rome distribution network about 50% of the SS are
remotely controlled);
– Switches. The terminal SS of each feeder ends with a switch. The network
exhibits a “normal conﬁguration” when all the switches of the terminal SS are
open. In general, this conﬁguration represents the optimal conﬁguration for the
electric operator and he/she usually will aim to manage the network in this
conﬁguration. Anyway, due to failures/maintenance this is not always possible.
Fig. 11 Modelled components of the electric grid
7ACEA Distribuzione SpA, the major electrical distribution operator in the area of Regione Lazio
(Italy).
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By closing the switches, it is possible to energize the SS belonging to one feeder
through other PS belonging to other feeders thus changing the normal
conﬁguration.
In a real electrical distribution network, as soon as a failure occurs, some actions
are performed by speciﬁc automatic control systems. For instance, the protection
systems open some switches in order to avoid the propagation of the failure as well
as the damage of electrical components (e.g., electrical feeders). Within a delay of
the order of milliseconds, there is usually an automatic reaction of the network to a
failure (of a component or along the lines). This automatic reaction is instantaneous,
so if the failure happens at time t0 all actions performed by the protection systems
will be performed at t0. Soon after the perception of the fault, the electric operator
will be notiﬁed alarms through the SCADA system and will try to isolate the
failures as well as to reconﬁgure the electrical network to provide electrical power
to those substations that might be involved in the blackout. The automatic reaction
produces the blackout of an entire feeder containing electrical substations (from a
few up to some tens, in the worst case). At this stage, the electric operator can
usually perform one (or more) of the following actions:
(1) To “remotely” perform failure isolation and reconﬁguration actions of the
network by sending commands to the remotely controlled substations;
(2) To dispatch Emergency crews (usually deployed in the ﬁeld) to “manually”
perform failure isolation and reconﬁguration actions of the network;
(3) To “deliver” Power Generators (usually located in deposits) to feed isolated
substations for the time being (from some hours to some days) required to
repair the failure.
In order to make use of the remote control capability, the operator should ﬁrst
verify the reachability of the remotely controlled devices (e.g., Remote Terminal
Units or Programmable Logic Controllers) deployed in the substations and required
to perform the opening and closure of breakers. At this stage, dependency mech-
anisms can play a crucial role. Indeed, the faulted electrical feeders can inhibit the
power supply to some BTS. Considering the strong interdependency among elec-
trical SS and telecommunication BTS, damages occurring in one (or both) network
can cause disruptions that hold in the short time scale (from a few minutes up to
some hours) leaving people without power and/or mobile communication services.
As mentioned, if remote control is available, the electric operator will send
commands to close switches to re-energize part of the network. These actions
usually take some minutes to be completed (e.g., 3–5 min). In case the SCADA
system is not working or the devices cannot be remotely controlled, the electric
operator must dispatch an emergency crew to manually perform reconﬁguration
action. In this case, emergency crew actions may require about 1 h to be completed
(depending on the state of urban trafﬁc). However, there are cases where no actions
are available to re-energize part of the network. In such cases, the only possible
option is to send one (or more) Power Generator to supply the Low Voltage
(LV) line(s) usually supplied by electrical substations. The action of displacing a
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Power Generator and re-supplying a single Medium Voltage (MV) line may require
some hours to be completed.
RecSIM takes into account all these procedures and the number of emergency
crews and power generators available to the electric operator to estimate the evo-
lution of the networks.
In order to use RecSIM to reproduce a generic electric network the following
information about the electric network topology are required:
– The connecting feeders for each PS;
– The ordered sequence of SS connected to the different feeders;
– The position of the terminal switches that can enable any network
reconﬁguration;
– The set of SS that can be connected (closing the switches) to each terminal SS to
implement a contingency to reenergize some SS after some failures occur.
– The remotely controlled SS;
– The set of BTS providing connectivity to the remotely controlled SS;
– The set of SS feeding the BTS;
– The number and the initial position of the emergency crews and power
generators.
RecSIM can, on the basis of the available resources, optimize the sequence of
restoration operations to be followed in order to produce the least consequences to
citizens and/or to minimize the overall outage time. RecSIM allows the operator to
autonomously design a strategy given by an ordered sequence of operations to
restore the networks. In the latter, no optimization procedures are involved.
Operators are committed to release their services with a predeﬁned Quality Level
expressed, for instance, by using the Service Continuity Indicator measured in





where kmin is the sum of the products between the number of minutes of outages
times Tk for each k-th SS and uk is the number of electric customers fed by the k-th
SS considered for the interval time of interest.
Other than the number of kmin expected before the crisis end, additional opti-
mization functions could be used in the optimization strategy. CIPCast, in its
Consequences Analysis module (see next section), can produce a more
“societal-oriented” optimization function which takes into account the reduction of
well-being of different societal sectors (Citizens, Economic Activities, Public
Services etc.). RecSIM allows to choose among different optimisation functions
before launching the optimisation strategy.
Figure 12 shows the Impact Scenario for a limited area of the electrical grid of
Rome where it is possible to observe the SS affected by an electric outage.
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Figure 13, in turn, indicates the best possible route to be followed by a technical
crew to reach the site where a restoration operation should be executed. The path
could also be determined as a function of the current or predicted state of urban
trafﬁc, by considering, in the shortest path algorithm, the different times needed to
tread the different arcs of the city street graph. CIPCast is also connected to an
application which, based on historical trafﬁc data and the current real time data, can
predict the state of trafﬁc in the next 90 min. Trafﬁc prediction can improve the
quality of the identiﬁcation of the shortest path (Fig. 13) to be suggested to the
Fig. 12 Snapshot of RecSIM GUI (colours from green to yellow denote increasing expected
outage times over an interval of interest)
Fig. 13 Route executed by an emergency crew to isolate a faulted substation
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technical crew to move toward the site where the technical intervention should be
produced.
8 Consequence Analysis
After having deﬁned the damages produced by a natural event or by a man-made
incident and recognised the impacts that those damages might produce on the
functioning of CI, the CIPCast system attempts to estimate, as the ﬁnal step, the
consequences produced on society by the events striking a given area.
As the Service Continuity indicator (kmin) is one of the major KPI of an
electrical Utility, CIPCast performs the estimate of such an indicator. The service
standard requested to the operator by Public Authorities (expressed in terms of
minutes of LT outages per year) takes in some way a social meaning as this value
represents a socially acceptable duration of loss of a relevant service as electrical
power and users are retained as equally important. Moreover, CIPCast attempts to
estimate the possible consequences of a crisis scenario taking into account other
metrics weighting losses that any outage might create to the different societal
sectors.
It is worth noting that although we mostly refer to natural events, the same
Consequence Analysis model could be usefully applied to any event (also of
anthropic origin) on CI which produces an impact on their services.
In order to deﬁne the scope of the Consequence Analysis (CA hereafter) it is
useful to point out that, in general, a natural event produces two types of
consequences:
• direct consequences encompassing all the effects due to the direct damages
produced by the event (disruptions, contingencies etc.);
• indirect consequences considering the loss of the well-being produced by the
unavailability of Primary Services (PS) supplied by CI, which are
– electricity (provided by the electrical system, i.e. transmission and distri-
bution grids)
– telecommunication (voice and data communication types)
– water (drinkable water)
– gas (and other energetic products)
– mobility (unavailability of public transports induced by other PS outages).
Taking an earthquake as a case study, for example, we will ascribe to the direct
consequences the number of casualties (due to buildings collapse following the
earthquake) and the economic cost needed to restore/retroﬁt (or rebuild) the dam-
aged buildings. In turn, we attribute to indirect consequences the social and eco-
nomic costs inflicted to the society by the unavailability (or partial availability) of
the primary services (electricity, telecommunications, drinkable water, mobility
etc.). Thus damages on CI elements produce impacts on their services which inflict
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consequences (of the class of indirect consequences) to societal life. Although
CIPCast is able to consider both types of consequences, a major effort has been
carried out to set up a model able to estimate the indirect consequences.
The ﬁrst step of the Consequence Analysis has been the identiﬁcation of the
sectors of the societal life to be considered, in order to fully describe the indirect
consequences inflicted by a crisis of CI services to those sectors and, for a given
sector, to each sector’s element as well as to identify—for each sector element—the
“consequence metric” Ci which better measures the extent of the consequences.
A thorough analysis has allowed to focus on the most vulnerable sectors prone to
be damaged (in terms of well-being reduction, Wealth hereafter) by the unavail-
ability (or a partial availability) of PS supplied by CI:
– Sector 1 is about Citizens and the consequence metric C1 provides a measure on
the number of Citizens involved and the extent of the reduction of the
well-being caused by the PS outage;
– Sector 2 is about the economic activities and the consequence metric C2 takes
into account the amount of the GDP lost due to PS unavailability;
– Sector 3 is about Public activities and services such as schools, hospitals, public
ofﬁces. The consequence metric C3 gives indication about the number of
affected activities and/or their reduction of capabilities (PS outages or reduction
could lead to a reduction in the number of healed patients per hour in a hospital,
while partial blackouts could reduce the number of potential users of public
transportations etc.)
– Sector 4 is about the Environment and the consequence metric C4 is expected to
give clues about (long term and short term) environmental damages (dimension
of polluted areas, expected costs for reclaiming etc.).
The CA model refers to the identiﬁcation (and a quantitative estimate) of an
expectedWealth for each Sector element and the way to estimate its reduction upon
loss (or reduction) of the beneﬁts associated to the PS availability.
We can deﬁne the Wealth W(t, tij) of a societal Sector element tij as a function
of the available Services Qk at time t as follows:
W t; tij





Wealth of a societal Sector element
ð1Þ
where:
• Nk is the total number of the considered Services which contribute to Wealth
(electricity, telecommunication, gas, water and mobility);
• Mij is the Wealth metric (for example, number of people who can access and
need to rely on the Services, or the expected/projected turnout in the economy
sector j during the time period T).
• rk(tij) is the relevance of the k-th Service for the achievement of the maximum
level of the Wealth quantity M for a given element of Criteria.
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• Qk is the availability level of Service k (if Qk = 0 the Service is fully unavail-
able). Qk depends explicitly on time and describes the pattern followed by the
outage of the k-th Service during the time course of the Crisis. The function
Qk(t) is the outcome of the Impact Analysis.
The elements rk(tij) are the measure of the relevance of the Service k for the
Wealth achievement in a given Sector element. For this reason, they will be
identiﬁed as Service Access Wealth (SAW) indices. They may be different from
each other: a Sector element can be more vulnerable to the absence of a given PS
and, thus, its Wealth most affected if that speciﬁc PS would fail. We then consider a




  ¼ 1 8 tij
Closure relation of SAW indices
ð2Þ
It is worth noticing that a more accurate analysis would imply the use of a
residual term (rk(tij) with k = Nk + 1). This further term would account for the fact
that for many societal Sectors, the eventual loss of all services would not imply a
total loss of well-being. In other words, the loss of all Services, as a whole, will
reduce of a different amount the Wealth of the different societal Sectors. Thus we
would rewrite the closure relation in Eq. 2 by adding a further term which we




 þ rres tij  ¼ 1 8 tij
A more complete closure relation of SAW indices
ð3Þ
In a ﬁrst approximation, rk(tij) are considered as time-independent, although their
variation in time could be properly assumed (such as, e.g., the loss of a PS for an
economic activity could be less detrimental during the night hours when production
is stopped). The unitary closure constraint could be kept ﬁxed even in the case of
time variation of the SAW indices. For a discussion on the time-dependence of
SAW indices see Appendix 1.
If Qk(t) are all unitary, Wealth W is as expected. If, in turn, some Qk(t) will be
not unitary (or even vanishing) for some time during a period T, say, Wealth is
expected to be reduced accordingly. Thus we can identify as Consequence C for a
given Sector element in the time T of crisis duration the difference between the
expected and the achieved Wealth
C tij; T





Qk tð Þdt  rres tij
  
Consequence C on the Sector element tij
ð4Þ
It’s worth pointing out that
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C tij; T
  ¼ 0 if QkðtÞ ¼ 1 for all k and for all t 2 ½0; T 
C tij; T
  ¼ M tij T 1 rres tij  	 if QkðtÞ ¼ 0 forall k and for all t 2 ½0; T 
Extreme Consequence values
ð5Þ
The residue term represents the part of the Wealth which could not be attributed
to the deployment of the Primary Services; if it is non-vanishing, it inhibits the
possibility that the Consequence C becomes as large as the total Wealth (see Eq. 5).
The CA model requires the identiﬁcation of two sets of data: the Wealth metric
M(tij) and the SAW indices rk(tij) for all the Sector elements tij. The Primary
Services (PS) availability functions Qk(t) are, in turn, the output of the Impact
module of the system. Before considering the SAW indices estimate procedure, it is
worth identifying the Sector elements that the model will consider for a complete
assessment of societal consequences after a CI crisis (Table 3).
9 SAW Indices Estimate
The evaluation of the SAW indices for the different Sector elements may require the
use of different approaches (and data sources). Information about Citizens are
provided by the National Institutes of Statistics (in Italy, ISTAT8) and could be
reﬁned by data provided by service Utilities. Information on economic sectors could
be, in turn, obtained at the Chambers of Commerce or from trade category
Associations or elicited by speciﬁc historical or ad hoc surveys.
To elicit the SAW indices for each Sector element, multiple data sources may be
used, either alternatively or jointly.
It is clear that, being societal Sectors different from each other, the meaning of
the term “relevance” (identifying the impact that the unavailability of a speciﬁc PS
would have on each Sector) will be very different: we will span from discomfort to
economic losses or to the threat of physical integrity. The chosen metrics M(tij)
Table 3 List of all considered sectors elements for the CA analysis
Sector Elements









Public services Schools Hospital Public
transportation
Safety and security
Environment Land Sea Water basins
8Italian National Institute of Statistics (http://www.istat.it/en/about-istat).
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expressing the Wealth for a given Sector element will account for these issues.
When M(tij) is an economic value (the production value for a given plant, for
instance), the term “relevance” (and the associated SAW indices) will express the
importance of a speciﬁc PS to allow the plant to achieve the planned production
value. There could be, obviously, activities whose production is more related to the
availability of electrical power (i.e. manufacturing), while in other cases it is more
related to availability of telecommunications (i.e. digital commerce). This difference
will reflect into the values of the corresponding SAW indices.
The following tables (Tables 4 and 5) report the relationships between the term
“relevance” and the different Sector’s elements through the indication of the related
Wealth metrics M(tij).
In the following, we will describe the way to approach the SAW indices iden-
tiﬁcation from available data for two different Sectors: Citizens and Economic
Activities. In the ﬁrst case, a complete assessment of the indices will be provided,
where the attempt to estimate time-dependency of relations will also be done.
9.1 SAW Indices Estimate for the Citizens Sector
Table 6 summarises the indices to be calculated for the Sector “Citizens” and its
elements.
Table 4 Association of the relevance concept to each of the CA sectors
Sector Wealth
metrics
Concept used to identify SAW indices
Citizens # Affected
people
Level of usage of each PS in the daily life; prioritization














Table 5 Type of data used for the identiﬁcation of SAW indices for a given sector
Sector Wealth metrics Data used to determine SAW indices
Citizens # Affected
people
Hours of usage and priority of the different PS
Economic
activities




Elicitation with stakeholders and Public Services
operators
Environment Areas affected Elicitation with stakeholders and Environmental
operators
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First of all, it is worth reporting one of our main ﬁndings which is that inferring
the relevance of services for different Sector elements from the analysis of the
family budget devoted (by each Sector element) to the access to a speciﬁc PS is not
accurate enough because it is very difﬁcult to take into account important factors
such as family income, different technologies and different service pricing (we are
interested in the usage and its relevance, not in the expenditure), although such
analysis can give a rough initial clue about the relevance ratio among elements of
the same Sector.
In fact, we found that a more accurate analysis takes into account service usage
(time and criticality) and—as far as it concerns the Electricity usage from different
customers—interesting hints can be found in the measurement campaigns [3–5].
More in details, in [5] the authors deﬁned as relevant—for the Italian case—the
following power-enabled “services” ordered by priority: lighting, refrigerator and
freezer, oven, TV, microwave, washing machine, dish washer, drier, iron. They also
included in their analysis cooking facilities as they included kitchen with induction
as an electrical load: its priority is lower than the fridge and higher than the oven.
The rationale behind the sequence above is the following. Lighting is the ﬁrst
service in order of importance because of the personal safety which would be
affected by its absence and the fact that no activity is possible in the absence of
illumination. The refrigerator and the freezer were placed nearly at the same priority
level as their continued operation is essential for the proper storage of food which,
should remain at room temperature for too long without being consumed, lose their
health and should be thrown away. Next primary service is the kitchen, less
important just than a refrigerator and freezer also because its massive use is limited
at mealtimes, when usually no other parallel activities are in place. As it has been
said before, in Italy kitchen is usually gas powered but priority considerations are
still valid.
Next appliances alias services in our priority list are electric oven and TV. This
is because, based on the frequency of use and perceived importance of the service
provided, they can be seen as equally important.
The microwave was placed behind the TV as it does not really offers an essential
service: in Italy, it is actually a substitute for traditional stoves, typically used to
heat the food in a short time and rarely to cook.
Other appliances like washing machine, dishwasher and dryer were considered
less important than, for example, the microwave because of the duration of use.
According to the authors of [5] in fact, considering that the microwave is usually
Table 6 SAW matrix for the four different Elements of the Citizens Sector
Sector elements Primary services (PS)
Electricity Telecom Water Gas Mobility
Citizens 65+ t11 r1(t11) r2(t11) r3(t11) r4(t11) r5(t11)
Citizens 0–5 t12 r1(t12) r2(t12) r3(t12) r4(t12) r5(t12)
Citizens with disabilities t13 r1(t13) r2(t13) r3(t13) r4(t13) r5(t13)
Citizens 18–64 t14 r1(t14) r2(t14) r3(t14) r4(t14) r5(t14)
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used for short periods, it makes more sense—with respect to the perception of
comfort—to interrupt a wash cycle rather than having to wait maybe an hour or
more to warm a cup of tea.
Behind them it has been placed the iron, since according to the logical order of
use is the latest after the dryer but still less urgent than a cycle of the dishwasher.
Other appliances are not included because they offer services that are not
necessities but are related mostly to individual needs. These include hair dryer,
vacuum cleaner but also PC and videogames.
Taking into account the above suggestions and making hypothesis about usage
for the different Sectors when they are at home, we calculated for the different
groups different proﬁles (see Appendix) that are coherent with independent studies
and measurement campaign, for example [3, 4].
Backed up by the good matching with experimental results, we applied the same
methodology to water and gas and, as we didn’t ﬁnd similar independent studies
assessing the priority of different gas—an water-enabled services, we built our
proﬁles based on the knowledge of the typical Italian household. More in details,
we considered the stove, the water heating and the heater as gas-enabled services
and drinking water, domestic water and waste water as water-enabled services.
Resulting proﬁles are shown in Appendix.
About the SAW indices related to Telco services, we considered mobile, land-
line and Internet. As far as their usage in time is concerned, different customer
proﬁles have been taken into account (for example, employed people will not stay
at home between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m.; for them, a home telco outage would not have a
signiﬁcant impact). On the other hand, as far as the priority is concerned, ISTAT
has gathered a “microdata” set reporting the answers to a speciﬁc survey with 760
questions of 20,000 households. Questions are on different subjects and 50 of them
are related to the usage of the telco services and their relevance for different groups.
Summing up the number of different services each group uses very often we found
the required indices.
At the end, the SAW indices for the different Citizens Sector elements are
reported in Table 7. To make the consequence calculation easier they are
time-independent although the carried out analysis is deﬁnitely time-depended. The
conversion has been done by summing up all the usages in all the timestamps and
normalizing to the highest value.
Table 7 SAWI matrix for the elements of the citizens sector
Sector elements PS
Electricity Telecom Water Gas Residue
Citizens 65+ t11 0.398 0.126 0.343 0.134 0
Citizens 0–5 t12 0.234 0 0.181 0.095 0.49
Citizens 18–64 t14 0.288 0.145 0.212 0.097 0.258
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Please note that the analysis assumes a “normal” situation to assess the priorities
but we are aware that priorities during an emergency could change. As an example,
charging batteries for mobile phones—according to what happened in the 2002
Flooding in Germany—could be a separately proﬁled function and could be high in
rank. Anyway, assessing the priorities during an emergency strongly depends on
the type of crisis and on the speciﬁc scenario.
9.2 SAW Indices Estimate for the Economic Activities
Sector
As far as it concerns the Economy Activities Sector, Table 8 summarizes the SAW
indices to be calculated for the Economic Activities Sector elements (Primary,
Secondary and Tertiary activity areas) for the PS.
As previously stated, in the Economic Activities Sector elements the relevance
of each PS has been related to the effects that their unavailability would have in
terms of economic losses, i.e. relevant is all that is needed to perform the related
production (of goods or services).
Thus the Wealth metrics is the turnover produced (in a given amount of time)
and the Consequences are measured in terms of turnover lost. For this reason, an
accurate and reliable estimate of the value of M(tij)—i.e. the expected turnover
produced per time unit—is a relevant quantity to be determined beforehand.
For achieving these data, still keeping a statistical approach, we have used the
input-output matrices [6]. These data are usually released by the National Institute
of Statistics and acknowledged in the national accounts of many countries.
The input-output tables are n  n matrices representing the mutual relations
between the various economical activities, showing which and how goods and
services produced (output) by each activity are used by others as inputs in their
production processes. In Appendix 2, we elaborate on the speciﬁc case of the
deﬁnition of SAW indices for the economic sectors.
10 Other Operation Modes and Future Work
Other than releasing “real time” prediction (i.e. in a 24/7 operational mode) by
collecting external data from forecasts and ﬁeld sensors, CIPCast can also be used
in “off-line” mode. In this mode of operations, real external scenario could be
Table 8 SAW indices for the three different elements of the economy criterion
CA criteria Services
Electricity Telecom Water Gas Mobility
Primary t31 r1(t31) r2(t31) r3(t31) r4(t31) r5(t31)
Secondary t32 r1(t32) r2(t32) r3(t32) r4(t32) r5(t32)
Tertiary t33 r1(t33) r2(t33) r3(t33) r4(t33) r5(t33)
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substituted by synthetic events whose main manifestations are somehow introduced
in the B1 block as if they were real. In this respect CIPCast can simulate synthetic
events (it can currently simulate synthetic earthquakes and abundant rainfalls in
speciﬁc area). This operation mode is called “Event Simulator”. This mode is meant
to be used by operators and other Public Authorities for producing stress tests of
their systems and/or to study contingency plans adapted to expected (or risky)
events. This could enhance the ability of designing preparedness measures and
contingency plans, other than revealing (upon quantitative analysis) infrastructural
elements which could be able to trigger large faults if damaged. Figure 14 shows
the disruption expected in the area of the city of Florence upon the production of
synthetic earthquake in a nearby Apennines area.
A further CIPCast operation mode allows to insert punctual damages by hand,
by the operator. Some CI element failure (belonging to one or more infrastructures)
could be inserted and the Impact Scenario (with its Consequence Analysis) esti-
mated accordingly. This operation mode (Damage Simulator) could be used to
estimate the impact on services produced by types of damages which could hardly
be thought as produced by speciﬁc natural events but could be rather related to
intentional attacks (i.e. a patchy distribution of damages). Also in this case, CIPCast
can be used to produce stress-tests, for highlighting elements whose fault could
trigger an high impact on service(s). This can be particularly relevant for operators
and authorities for planning appropriate actions for security enhancement of their
assets.
Fig. 14 Primary damages to Florence buildings induced by a strong earthquake synthetically
produced in a nearby region at the north-east of the city (magnitude 6.5 Richter). Mean damages
considered in a normalized 5-level scale (EMS-98)
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CIPCast and its DB could act as a central system enabling to gather and to
broadcast a number of relevant information, also through the use of innovative
multi-media solutions. In the following we report the directions of a number of
on-going project to support the usability of CIPCast contents and forecasts.
(a) CIPCast is going to integrate data on vehicle trafﬁc status and predictions in a
time span of 90 min. This information will be cast into the optimization system
(RecSim) for the outage simulation in a way to drive the displacements of
technical crew particularly in urban areas where trafﬁc congestion avoidance
could allow to save time and reduce the overall outage duration.
(b) Data on the paths followed by the CI networks in complex urban areas will be
let available through Augmented Reality applications. These will allow a ﬁeld
operator (technical crews, ﬁre ﬁghters etc.) to have on the screen of his mobile
device (smartphone, tablet) the real view of a given area (taken by the device
camera) on which is superimposed the real trace of the speciﬁc network. To this
trace could be associated other information (technical, contact person etc.)
which might highly help the emergency or technical crews to have, on site, the
largest possible information data needed to solve the problem.
11 Conclusions
CI protection and the management of Emergency situation is a major concern of
Public Authorities at all scales; from the national one, as severe blackout could
produce extended and often uncontrolled perturbations, to the local (city) scales
where lack of resilience (i.e. lack of preparedness actions) might result in frequent,
albeit limited in space and time perturbations. These, however, could produce
damages on citizen’s well-being, with associated economical costs, and moreover
undermine citizens conﬁdence in the public administration.
CIPCast belongs to a new class of DSS which attempts to act at three different
levels:
(a) the “operational” level, by producing an operational (24/7) state of risk of CI
allowing operators and Public Authorities to undertake preparedness actions;
(b) At the emergency level, CIPCast can be used as a coordination tools for sharing
information at different;
(c) At the level of elaboration of contingency plan, by stress testing the CI
networks.
Being usable in different operational modes (either fed with 24/7 real time data
or by synthetic events of with synthetic damages), CIPCast could be a mean for
stress-testing, planning, design of new generation networks and design of coherent
contingency plans which could be the result of ad hoc simulations where realistic
conditions could be reproduced.
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Appendix 1
The availability of a large amount of data has allowed, only for the Citizens Sectors,
to deﬁne, for each service and for each Sector elements, the time variation of SAW
indices along the course of the day. As the priority could not be constant, the
objective is therefore to condense in a graph the possible variations of the priority
and, thus, the subsequent variation of the SAW indices.
In order to provide a priority index to each “service” enabled by electricity, for
each Sector element and with a granularity of 30 min we set the priority value to
• 1: if the service is most likely needed. Example: lighting in the early morning or
in the evening.
• 0.5: if the service may not be needed but—should it be needed—would be
critical. Example: lighting late at night, when most people is sleeping.
• 0: if not needed or not a big issue if missing. Example: lighting at home
whenever people is at work, or also lighting at noon.
• 0.1: for loads and services which can generally be postponed. Example: dish-
washer or washing machine.
In order to perform this exercise, we have proﬁled the users as follows:
• Citizens 18–64: working or studying, they get up at 6 a.m., go sleeping at
11.30 p.m., leave home at 8.30 a.m. at the latest and return home at 4.30 p.m. at
the earliest. Breakfast is usually between 6.00 a.m. and 7.30 a.m., dinner
between 8.00 p.m. and 9.00 p.m.
• Citizens 65+: retired from work, getting up at 6 a.m. and going to bed at
11.00 p.m., they could be at home at any time. Breakfast is usually between
6.00 a.m. and 7.30 a.m., lunch between 12.30 p.m. and 1.30 p.m., dinner
between 7.30 p.m. and 8.30 p.m.
• Citizens 0–5: getting up at 6.30 a.m. and going to bed at 9.30 p.m. on average,
they usually are not at home between 8.30 a.m. and 4.30 p.m. if they are older
than 3, while—if younger than 3—the younger the more likely that they are at
home.
Using these proﬁles, we have determined the following global relevance index
for electricity needs for the three Citizens Sector elements (age 18–64, age >65 and
age <5) (Fig. 15).
Using a similar approach, we can identify the relevance of the other PS. The
following graphs show the (not normalised) temporal proﬁle of the relevance
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Fig. 15 Temporal proﬁle of the relevance of electrical power for different population segments
Fig. 16 Temporal proﬁle of the relevance of CIs for the different classes of the sector “Citizens”
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emphasising the absolute value (Fig. 16) and the contribute (Fig. 17) of each CI to
the well-being of the citizens.
The following graphs (Fig. 18) show the relevance of each CI for different
population segments.
Fig. 17 Cumulative temporal proﬁle of the relevance of CIs for the different classes of the sector
“Citizens”
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Appendix 2
The input-output matrices are n  n matrices representing the mutual relations
between the various economical activities, showing, which and how, goods and
services produced (output) by each activity are used as inputs by other Sector for
their production processes. These data are usually released by the National Institute
of Statistics and acknowledged in the national accounts of many countries.
Fig. 18 The estimated temporal proﬁle of the relevance of water, gas and telecommunication
services for the different population segments
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More in details provided data are:
– a branch-by-branch table indicating the amount of production of each branch
used for the production in the others;
– a product table for the product, indicating the products needed for the production
of each product.
Let us consider a basic example [6].
Table 9 (read by row) indicates that
– Agriculture produces 30 quintals of wheat, 7.5 of them being consumed by itself
(seeds), 6 from industry and 16.5 by the families (wheat, meat, fruit, etc.).
– Industry produces 50 m of cloth, of which: 14 m are consumed by agriculture, 6
by the industry itself and 30 by families;
– Households provide in total of 300 man-years (300 men engaged in the work
the whole year), and the above table tell us also that 80 of them are employed in
agriculture (farmers), 180 in industry (workers) and 40 are employed in house
works.
On the other hand (reading the same table by columns):
– Agriculture employs 7.5 quintals of wheat, 14 m of cloth to 80 man-years to
produce 30 quintals of wheat;
– Industry employs 6 tons of wheat, 6 m of fabric and 180 man-years to produce
50 meters of cloth;
– families spend their earned income to buy 16.5 tons of grain, 30 m of fabric and
40 years-working man to sustain life of 300 man-year.
The price system ensures the effective possibility of exchanging goods between
different sectors; in the case of Table 10, prices are 20 euro for a quintal of wheat,
Table 9 Simpliﬁed model for an economy with three sectors
To From
Agriculture Industry Households Total
Agriculture 7.5 6 16.5 30 quintals of wheat
Industry 14 6 30 50 meters of cloth
Household 80 180 40 300 man-years of effort
Table 10 Simpliﬁed input-out value model for an economy with three sectors
To From
Agriculture Industry Households Total
Agriculture 150 120 330 600
Industry 210 90 450 750
Household 240 540 120 900
Total 600 750 900 2250
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15 euro for a meter of cloth, 3 euro for a year-working man. This results in the
following table of values.
The ﬁrst line shows that the agricultural sector uses 150 euro of its product
(direct use or farmer exchange), it sells part of the industry for 120 euro and the rest
to families for 330 euro, with a total revenue of 600 euro.
In the same way—with the assumption that all money spent by industry con-
tributes to the production and, thus, to the turnout—we grouped all industries (with
different NACE codes) in Primary, Secondary and Tertiary sectors and then we
calculated, for each sector, the fraction of the whole budget they spent for the
different CI related services. We found where relevance for Gas is not available as
in the input-output matrices Electricity and Gas are considered in the same PS
(Table 11).
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